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Abstract
On July 31, 2001, for the ﬁrst time in its history, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
began trading three unlisted securities. The DIA, SPY, and QQQ are the most actively traded
Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) and are listed on the American Stock Exchange. On April 15,
2002 another 27 ETFs followed. These two events provide a unique experiment for studying
the impact of a new entrant on market quality. In contrast to recently revived concerns about
the adverse impact of market fragmentation, we document that the NYSE entry leads to a dra-
matic improvement in liquidity that we attribute to the elimination of market-maker rents.
 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classiﬁcation: G24; G23
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1. Introduction
In recent years, there has been a strong regulatory interest in the question whether
fragmentation of order ﬂow is beneﬁcial or not. During the past two decades, certain
order types for securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) have in-
creasingly migrated to alternative trading venues including NASDAQ, Electronic
Communication Networks (ECNs), and regional exchanges. This development was
aided by the establishment of the National Market System (including the InterMar-
ket Trading System) by the SEC, the elimination of NYSE Rule 390 which re-
stricted oﬀ-board trading for some exchange-listed stocks (SEC Rule 19c-3), and
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the increasing availability of innovative electronic crossing and trading networks. 1
The proliferation of alternative trading venues and practices such as internalization
and payment for order ﬂow have led to concerns raised by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) about the attendant fragmentation of stock markets. 2
The issue is whether increased competition among market centers has beneﬁcial ef-
fects on trading costs and price discovery, or detrimental eﬀects because order ﬂow is
dispersed across several locations without much interaction. We contribute to this
discussion by examining the entry of the NYSE into the trading of Exchange Traded
Funds (ETFs).
On April 6, 2001, the NYSE announced that it seeks regulatory approval for trad-
ing the three most active ETFs, the Nasdaq-100 Trust Series I (the ‘‘QQQ’’), the
Standard and Poors Depository Receipt Trust Series I (the ‘‘SPY’’), and the Dow
Jones Industrial Average Trust Series I (the ‘‘DIA’’). 3 In early 2001, these three se-
curities together generated an average daily trading volume of about $5 billion. 4 The
event was expected to pose a major challenge for the American Stock Exchange
(AMEX), the main listing and trading venue for ETFs. 5 Prior to the NYSE entry
on July 31, 2001, ETFs traded on AMEX (constituting most of its equity-related
trading volume), the Nasdaq InterMarket, the regional exchanges, and the Island
ECN. On April 15, 2002, the NYSE began trading 27 additional AMEX-listed
ETFs.
These two events mark the ﬁrst time in its history that the NYSE is trading un-
listed securities under Unlisted Trading Privileges (UTP). 6 We believe that the
simultaneous presence of three characteristics make these events a unique experiment
to study the eﬀect of order fragmentation on competition, liquidity, trading volume,
and price discovery. First, and most importantly, our experiment controls for the
trading protocol: the NYSE uses virtually the same protocol as the dominant incum-
bent, the AMEX. Second, it does not involve a new competitor who focuses only on
a narrow segment of order ﬂow. While analyses of competitors such as Madoﬀ (Bat-
talio, 1997), crossing networks and ECNs (Conrad et al., 2001; Huang, 2002) and
regional exchanges (Lee, 1993) provide valuable inferences on relative market qual-
ity, it is possible that their results reﬂect diﬀerent types of order ﬂow. If traders en-
dogenously choose among these markets, it may be diﬃcult to control for diﬀerences
1 See Blume (2000) for a discussion of the National Market System and its limitations.
2 As pointed out, for example, by SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt in a speech at Northwestern Law
School, March 16, 2000. See also US SEC (2000a,b), where the SEC requested comments on the issue,
soliciting opinions on the extent of fragmentation, whether fragmentation has isolated orders, hampered
quote competition, reduced liquidity, increased short-term volatility, and on possible solutions. Empirical
evidence suggests that the practice of internalization of and payments for order ﬂow magnify the negative
eﬀects of market fragmentation. See, for example, Easley et al. (1996) and Huang and Stoll (1996).
3 Wall Street Journal, 4/6/2001, p. C9.
4 Across all US market centers, see Goldman Sachs Derivatives and Trading Research Report on
Exchange Traded Funds, 06/29/2001.
5 The Wall Street Journal, 07/12/2001.
6 Rule 12f of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
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in order diﬃculty. For example, Madoﬀ and other market centers that pay for order
ﬂow screen out diﬃcult orders, and ECNs may attract traders that value execution
speed highly. In the ETF experiment, at least two markets (AMEX and NYSE) do
not screen incoming orders. Third, the new entrant does not compete by paying for
order ﬂow. For third-market trades, Bessembinder (2002) documents lower trading
costs when dealers compete on quotes and argues that without quote competition,
trading costs are greater due to payment for order ﬂow. This suggests that quote
competition provides a cleaner experiment than payment-for-order ﬂow competition
when assessing market quality. We explicitly document that each of the major mar-
ket centers engages in quote competition to attract ETF orders.
This paper further expands a growing literature on ETFs. Previous work com-
pares ETF returns to changes in their net asset value (Elton et al., 2002), analyzes
the tax consequences of holding ETFs (Poterba and Shoven, 2002), studies the dy-
namics of price deviations from the underlying portfolios (Engle and Sarkar, 2002),
and compares price discovery in the ETF cash market and index futures markets
(Hasbrouck, 2000). Despite the apparent importance of this market, little is known
to date about the costs and the market structure of ETF trading.
To assess market quality in the 30 ETFs before and after NYSE entry, we use sev-
eral measures of liquidity. We ﬁnd substantially lower trading costs across market
centers after the NYSE enters the market: overall liquidity improves not only be-
cause of the reduction in diﬀerent spread measures, but also because quoted depth
increases considerably and as a result the estimated price impact of trades declines.
We argue that this result is diﬃcult to reconcile with a competitive market for ETFs
before the NYSE entry.
The pre-UTP structure of ETF trading leads us to expect a highly competitive
market. AMEX specialists compete with limit orders, ECNs, and regional exchanges
for order ﬂow. In addition, previous studies oﬀer strong evidence that the implemen-
tation of the order handling rules (OHR) has increased competition among Nasdaq
market makers since 1997. 7 Given the additional competition for ETF order ﬂow by
third-market dealers, it is surprising to ﬁnd large eﬀects on trading costs associated
with the NYSE entry. Thus, we provide a detailed analysis of alternative explana-
tions for the decline in trading cost. First, we show that spreads are less sensitive
to order diﬃculty after the NYSE entry. Put diﬀerently, more diﬃcult orders de-
mand a lower premium after competition has increased. This suggests that market
maker rents associated with the execution of more diﬃcult orders may have de-
creased. Second, we estimate an indirect measure of market maker rents based on
a spread decomposition. We ﬁnd that the decline in estimated rents explains most
of the reduction in trading cost.
The component due to informed trading, however, also declines and we investigate
whether changes in informed trading can explain lower trading cost. We examine
price discovery in the competing market centers before and after the NYSE entry
7 See Weston (2000), Barclay et al. (1999), and US SEC (2001).
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by computing information shares (see Hasbrouck, 1995). 8 The intuition is that a
smaller portion of informed order ﬂow, relative to trading volume, could explain
lower spreads. Among the diﬀerent market centers, only information shares for
AMEX drop slightly after the NYSE enters the market. Thus, a smaller proportion
of informed trading may explain lower spreads on AMEX, but not for the Nasdaq
InterMarket or the overall market.
Finally, competition for market share may have resulted in below-cost pricing. To
address this issue, we estimate changes in trading cost and in ETF spreads relative to
their underlying portfolios during the nine months after NYSE entry. While the
analysis is confounded by the market closure in September 2001, we do not observe
that trading costs revert back to pre-UTP levels in any of the market centers that
trade the DIA, SPY, or QQQ. Moreover, given the substantial trading volume in
the three ETFs, pricing below cost would seem prohibitively expensive over extended
periods. Therefore, we conclude that lack of competition is a major cause of the ap-
parent market maker rents before the NYSE entry.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section oﬀers a brief
review of related literature. We describe the data in Section 2. In Section 3 we con-
duct our empirical tests and establish that market liquidity improves after the NYSE
begins UTP trading. In Section 4 we contrast alternative explanations for the decline
in trading cost and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Related literature
Theory oﬀers conﬂicting predictions about the eﬀects of splitting order ﬂow
among several market centers. Pagano (1989a,b) and others have argued that the
consolidation of order ﬂow leads to positive network externalities that beneﬁt trad-
ers. 9 On the other hand, Chowdry and Nanda (1991) analyze a situation where large
uninformed traders optimally split orders among market centers. They show that
these large traders are better oﬀ with competition among markets, because they ben-
eﬁt from the presence of the small traders who have only access to one market. Biais
(1993) models fragmented and centralized markets as diﬀerent auction mechanisms.
He shows that both market structures yield identical expected quoted spreads, al-
though quotes are more volatile in a centralized market where participants can ob-
serve their competitors current quotes. In contrast, Bernhardt and Hughson (1997)
show that trading costs increase when traders can split orders among market centers.
8 Hasbrouck (1995) applies this method to the 30 Dow stocks and ﬁnds that most of the information
production occurs on the NYSE (compared with the regional exchanges). Huang (2002) uses the same
method to examine information production by ECNs and Nasdaq market makers. See also Harris et al.
(1995), who estimate an error correction model to compare price discovery in IBM between the NYSE and
regional exchanges. Hasbrouck (2000) investigates price dynamics in three equity index markets. He ﬁnds,
for example, that for the S&P 500 index most of the price discovery occurs in the E-mini futures market,
followed by the regular futures and the ETF.
9 See OHara (1995) and Madhavan (2000) for surveys of related theoretical approaches to the
fragmentation question.
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Madhavan (1995) shows that fragmented markets decrease price competition, result-
ing in less eﬃcient prices.
We contribute to the literature that speciﬁcally examines the consequences of in-
creased competition in trading exchange-listed securities. 10 Several papers provide
evidence that is inconsistent with the view that fragmentation of order ﬂow aﬀects
market quality adversely. For example, Battalio (1997) examines bid–ask spreads
and the liquidity premium before and after the entry of a third-market broker-dealer
(Bernard L. Madoﬀ Investment Securities LLC), who is purchasing order ﬂow, into
the market for NYSE-listed securities. He ﬁnds that quoted spreads decrease and ef-
fective spreads do not increase, concluding that Madoﬀ causes an increase in compe-
tition based on a cost advantage in its order screening and trading technology. Fong
et al. (2001) analyze Australian markets and conclude that competition is beneﬁcial if
traders can choose where to direct their order ﬂow. 11 Conrad et al. (2001) ﬁnd lower
execution cost on ECNs and crossing networks compared to the primary trading av-
enues. Amihud et al. (2002) study warrant exercises and conclude that the consolida-
tion of trading increases liquidity. Mayhew (2002) and DeFontnouvelle et al. (2000)
ﬁnd that competition among options exchanges signiﬁcantly reduces both quoted
and eﬀective spreads. Wahal (1997) shows that bid–ask spreads on Nasdaq decline
with the number of dealers. On the other hand,there is also evidence that consolida-
tion of market centers is beneﬁcial. Arnold et al. (1999) ﬁnd that merging exchanges
attract order ﬂow and experience a decrease in bid–ask spreads. Jain (2001) analyzes
51 stock exchanges around the world and ﬁnds that spreads in centralized markets
are lower than in fragmented markets. 12
3. Data and research design
The ﬁrst US ETF, the SPDR Trust Series I (SPY), was listed on AMEX in 1993.
ETFs are organized either as unit investment trusts, managed funds, or grantor trusts.
ETFs that replicate an index (such as DIA, SPY, andQQQ) are unit investment trusts,
while others (e.g., sector Spiders and the iShares family) use sampling algorithms to
hold only a certain portion of an index and are organized as managed funds. Other
products, such as Holding Company Depository Receipts (HOLDRS), are grantor
trusts rather than registered investment companies and share many characteristics
with American Depository Receipts (ADRs). Unlike traditional index mutual funds,
10 A related branch of the literature compares trading costs in diﬀerent markets and market structures
(see, for example, Lee, 1993; Petersen and Fialkowski, 1994; Christie and Huang, 1994; Keim and
Madhavan, 1995, 1997).
11 See also Menkveld (2001), who analyzes four securities listed both on the NYSE and the Amsterdam
Stock Exchange. He argues that large traders strategically use their access to both markets in deciding
where to place orders.
12 Studies that analyze the eﬀect of eliminating restrictions on oﬀ-board trading by NYSE member
ﬁrms for certain exchange-listed stocks (SEC Rule 19c-3) (Cohen and Conroy, 1990; Davis and Lightfoot,
1998), obtain mixed results. In an analysis of the Rules repeal in May 2000, Kam et al. (2000) document
that it lowered quoted and eﬀective spreads.
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ETFs are traded continuously and are exempt from short-sale restrictions. Legally,
ETFs are continuously in distribution, because shares can be created and redeemed
after each trading day. Distributions and redemptions are made in kind by exchanging
the underlying stocks in blocks of 50,000 ETF units. This structure allows ETFs to
avoid tax expenses typically associated with shareholder redemptions of mutual-fund
shares. Depending on the organizational form, accrued dividends are usually held in a
separate interest-bearing account and are disbursed periodically, net of management
fees. ETF fees are typically much lower than those of index mutual funds. Finally,
in contrast to regular shares, market makers and specialists employ a variety of tools
to hedge their inventory and arbitrage price diﬀerentials. In addition to changing the
quote, oﬀsetting transactions can be made in the cash market of the underlying stocks,
the futures market, or in other ETFs with suﬃciently high correlations.
Our basic research strategy is to examine trade and quote data for the 30 ETFs for
two periods: the 21 trading days before the NYSE entered the market on July 31,
2001 (‘‘pre-UTP period’’), and the 21 subsequent trading days (‘‘post-UTP period’’).
We generally report results separately for the initial UTP group (DIA, SPY, and
QQQ) and average measures for the second group of 27 smaller ETFs. 13 We believe
this is sensible for two reasons. First, trading volume in the three large ETFs consti-
tutes around 80% of the entire consolidated ETF market; trading in the other 27
nearly makes up the rest. Therefore, the market for the ﬁrst group may diﬀer in sev-
eral aspects from that for the smaller ETFs and an individual analysis may provide
additional insights. Second, the experience of the ﬁrst UTP decision may aﬀect the
reaction to the second, which we control for by analyzing them separately. Empiri-
cally, this grouping does not qualitatively aﬀect our empirical results. In describing
our results, we will generally concentrate on the large ETFs and rely on the small
ones for cross-sectional testing.
The intraday trade and quote data for AMEX, NYSE, NASD and the regional
exchanges are from the Securities Industry Automation Corporations consolidated
trades (CT) and consolidated quotes (CQ) ﬁles. 14 We ﬁrst apply a set of basic data
13 The 27 ETFs that began UTP trading on April 15, 2002 include the following securities: B2B Internet
HOLDRS, Biotech HOLDRS, Broadband HOLDRS, Europe 2001 HOLDRS, Internet HOLDRS,
Internet Architecture HOLDRS, Internet Infrastructure HOLDRS, Market 2000+ HOLDRS, Oil Service
HOLDRS, Pharmaceutical HOLDRS, Regional Banks HOLDRS, Retail HOLDRS, Semiconductor
HOLDRS, Software HOLDRS, Telecom HOLDRS, Utilities HOLDRS, Wireless HOLDRS, S&P
MidCap 400 Depositary Receipts, Basic Industries Select Sector SPDR, Consumer Services Select Sector
SPDR, Consumer Staples Select Sector SPDR, Cyclical/Transportation Select Sector SPDR, Energy Select
Sector SPDR, Financial Select Sector SPDR, Industrial Select Sector SPDR, Technology Select Sector
SPDR, Utilities Select Sector SPDR.
14 The CT and CQ ﬁles we use are identical to those published with a six-week delay on TAQ. A
shortcoming of our analysis is that we cannot identify trades and quotes from ECNs other than
Archipelago. For example, the market share of Island ECN in QQQ trading rose steadily from 1% in
October 2000 to about 20% in July 2001. It fell to 17% in August 2001, probably aﬀected by the NYSE
entry, and then increased again to over 20% in late 2001 (as reported on www.island.com, 1/12/2002).
Island does not participate in ITS and therefore does not report its inside quote to the Consolidated Quote
System. On the other hand, its trades are printed on ACT and reported as part of Nasdaq volume, but are
not separately identiﬁed in the CT ﬁle.
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ﬁlters to trade and quote records. All observations before 9:30 a.m. and after 4:00
p.m. (4:15 p.m. for DIA, MDY, SPY, and QQQ), are excluded as are each markets
opening trade, reporting errors, irregular settlements, and opening and closing
quotes. In our analysis of trading costs, we include only NBBO-eligible quotes
and eliminate NASDAQ quotes that are not emitted by CAES. 15 Following Huang
and Stoll (1996), we delete trades when the change to the previous trade price exceeds
10% and quotes when the bid–ask spread is wider than $2. Only records with positive
prices and volumes or depth are included. The direction of a trade is inferred by
applying the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. As suggested by Bessembinder
(2003), we make no adjustment to the reported trade times (all results are qualita-
tively identical when we assume a ﬁve-second delay in trade reporting). Trades are
further classiﬁed into the following size categories: small (<500 shares), medium
(500–9999 shares), and large (P10,000 shares).
4. Empirical tests and results
We test the hypothesis that the NYSE entry has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on trading
costs. There are several arguments that support this hypothesis. First of all, prior
to the event, there was already signiﬁcant competition between and within the mar-
ket centers trading the ETFs (Amex, Nasdaq, ECNs, and the regional exchanges).
Exchange specialists face competition from ﬂoor traders and public limit orders. 16
In addition to the exchange specialists and several ECNs, about seven Nasdaq Inter-
Market market makers were already competing for order ﬂow in each of the three
large ETFs during the month before the NYSE entry. Since the introduction of
the OHR in 1997, public limit orders have competed directly with Nasdaq dealers
and superior dealer quotes submitted in private trading venues have had to be dis-
played to the public. 17 This leads us to expect little beneﬁt from additional compe-
tition.
Second, the ability of NYSE and AMEX to oﬀer low spreads should not diﬀer sig-
niﬁcantly. Christie and Huang (1994) ﬁnd only a small decrease in spreads for ﬁrms
that switch from the AMEX to the NYSE. Jones and Lipson (1997) ﬁnd no statis-
tically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between price adjustment parameters on the AMEX
and NYSE for ﬁrms switching between the two exchanges. Because both exchanges
are primarily auction markets, share the major specialist ﬁrms, and are generally
15 These are the NasdaqIntermarket quotes that are transmitted through ITS. Similar to the NBBO for
the entire market, CAES quotes represent the best NasdaqIntermarket quote across market makers for
exchange-listed securities.
16 See Harris and Hasbrouck (1996).
17 Before the introduction of the OHR, several studies have questioned the competitiveness of the
Nasdaq market (for example, Christie and Schultz, 1994; Christie et al., 1994). Barclay et al. (1999) and
Weston (2000) show that the OHR have signiﬁcantly reduced quoted and eﬀective spreads on Nasdaq
narrowing the diﬀerence in trading costs between Nasdaq and NYSE. Weston additionally provides
evidence that market maker rents have declined. See also a recent study by the SEC (US SEC, 2001).
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very similar in structure and organization, there is no obvious reason why the NYSE
entry should have noticeable eﬀects on trading costs.
A third reason why we would not expect a signiﬁcant impact of NYSE entry on
spreads is that ETFs have generically low trading cost, such that there is not much
‘‘room’’ to improve spreads. Engle and Sarkar (2002) ﬁnd that domestic ETFs are
priced eﬃciently and deviate little from their net asset values, so one might expect
that their trading cost are also related to those of the underlying securities. More-
over, ETFs are actively traded, derivative (‘‘basket’’) securities with lower potential
for adverse selection than stocks. 18
We postulate two alternative hypotheses: (1) the increased competition associated
with the NYSE entry leads to a reduction in trading cost; and (2) the negative eﬀects
associated with order ﬂow fragmentation impede the ability of the diﬀerent market
centers to provide eﬃcient prices. In this case, we would expect quoted and eﬀective
spreads to widen. One might argue that fragmentation is not an important issue be-
cause most US equity markets, including the NYSE, are linked through the Inter-
market Trading System (ITS). However, while ITS disseminates quotes among
participating market centers, it is not able to prevent order-ﬂow fragmentation
(one market center cannot view the current order ﬂow arriving at another). In addi-
tion, lack of time priority and slow ITS interactions between market centers reduce
the eﬀectiveness of ITS in linking markets informationally. Furthermore, most ECNs
(with the exception of Archipelago) do not participate in ITS and are therefore not
obligated to execute trades at the national best bid and oﬀer (NBBO). In fact, a very
small proportion of trading volume is going through ITS (about 2% for NYSE
stocks). 19 One might further argue that fragmentation is not an issue because ETFs
are less susceptible to asymmetric information than stocks (Subrahmanyam, 1991),
and because price discovery occurs largely in the futures markets (Hasbrouck,
2000). However, traders may still obtain private information about future changes
in economy-wide variables or about current order ﬂow that is not observable to
the market maker. Both examples suggest that the risk of trading against an in-
formed party is non-negligible also in ETFs.
In this section, we ﬁrst document how trading volume and relative market shares
changed in response to UTP trading on the NYSE. Second, we show that ETF trad-
ing is characterized by quote competition both before and after UTP trading. Third,
we compute several measures of trading costs before and after this event. We test
whether these measures change individually for each ETF and each market center.
Fourth, we analyze changes in the size (depth) of quotes. Finally, in addition to
18 Theoretical models of trading in diversiﬁed basket securities (Subrahmanyam, 1991; Gorton and
Pennacchi, 1993) predict that basket securities attract uninformed traders. This is because ﬁrm-speciﬁc
private information is diversiﬁed away in the basket security. From the perspective of the market maker,
this reduces the risk of informed trading, which in turn decreases the adverse-selection component of the
spread. Empirical studies (Jegadeesh and Subrahmanyam, 1993; Hegde and McDermott, 2001) are
consistent with this view.
19 Werner (2001), for example, ﬁnds that about 1.4–2.6% of trading volume in a size-stratiﬁed sample of
NYSE stocks from 1997 trade via ITS.
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the univariate comparison, we estimate regressions to control for factors known to
aﬀect spreads.
4.1. Changes in volume around the NYSE entry
Table 1 documents trading volume and typical trade size for each ETF before and
after the NYSE entered the market. While market-wide volume decreased from the
pre-UTP to the post-UTP period (not reported), total volume and the number of
trades increased for the SPY, the DIA, and the small ETFs (‘‘27 ETFs’’). Trading
activity decreased slightly for the QQQ. The NYSEs newly acquired ETF volume
exceeds the total volume change for the SPY and QQQ, but not for the DIA (where
the increase in total volume is about 18 million shares, of which nine million is cap-
tured by the NYSE). The mean trade size is similar before and after, increasing
slightly for the DIA (by about 300 shares). However, comparing average and median
trade size on the NYSE to those for all market centers together indicates that the
NYSE executes substantially larger trades than other markets in all three ETFs.
Table 2 presents market shares and trade sizes for four market centers (because of
their low market share, we treat the regional exchanges as one market center). Dur-
ing the ﬁrst month of UTP trading, the NYSE was able to gain an average market
share between 10% (27 ETFs) and 18% (SPY). This volume seems to be primarily
taken away from AMEX, but Nasdaq is also losing part of its market share. The
Table 1
Trading characteristics before and after UTP trading on the NYSE
ETF Before After After (NYSE only)
Total volume DIA 37,136,800 54,864,000 9,442,400
Total number of trades DIA 19,174 24,684 2,455
Mean trade size DIA 1937 2223 3846
Median trade size DIA 500 700 1500
Total volume SPY 177,429,100 196,509,300 34,947,300
Total number of trades SPY 58,455 67,488 9007
Mean trade size SPY 3035 2912 3880
Median trade size SPY 500 500 500
Total volume QQQ 849,685,100 822,311,400 114,918,600
Total number of trades QQQ 354,722 346,919 25,176
Mean trade size QQQ 2395 2370 4565
Median trade size QQQ 600 600 1000
Total volume 27 ETFs 274,749,200 325,585,400 31,130,300
Total number of trades 27 ETFs 96,066 114,824 8828
Mean trade size 27 ETFs 3469 4535 5511
Median trade size 27 ETFs 1538 2041 3931
This table shows how total trading volume (number of shares), the total number of trades, and the mean
and median trade size change for 30 ETFs when the NYSE enters trading (DIA, SPY, and QQQ are shown
separately). Before includes 21 trading days prior to NYSE entry; After includes 21 trading days
including and from that date. The last column depicts only the NYSEs volume, number of trades, and
trade size. The panel describing the 27 ETFs shows the total for this group.
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Table 2
Market shares and trade sizes before and after UTP trading on the NYSE by market center
Period After Before After Test of
equal
means/
medians
Before After Test of
equal
means/
medians
Before After Test of
equal
means/
medians
Market center ETF NYSE AMEX AMEX NAS-
DAQ
NAS-
DAQ
Regio-
nals
Regio-
nals
Total volume DIA 17% 66% 56% 30% 24% 5% 3%
Volume in trades<500 shares DIA 5% 47% 46% 28% 30% 25% 19%
Volume in trades<10,000 shares DIA 15% 60% 53% 33% 27% 7% 5%
Volume in tradesP10,000 shares DIA 20% 72% 59% 28% 20% 0% 1%
Total number of trades DIA 10% 54% 51% 30% 28% 16% 11%
Number of trades <500 shares DIA 6% 47% 45% 29% 30% 25% 20%
Number of trades <10,000 shares DIA 11% 58% 53% 31% 28% 11% 7%
Number of tradesP10,000 shares DIA 23% 76% 57% 24% 19% 1% 1%
Mean trade size DIA 3846 2365 2444 Æ 1935 1884 Æ 543 623 ++
Median trade size DIA 1500 600 1000 +++ 500 600 +++ 200 300 ++
Total volume SPY 18% 70% 58% 25% 20% 5% 5%
Volume in trades<500 shares SPY 12% 42% 32% 38% 37% 20% 19%
Volume in trades<10,000 shares SPY 15% 67% 56% 24% 21% 9% 8%
Volume in tradesP10,000 shares SPY 20% 72% 60% 25% 18% 3% 2%
Total number of trades SPY 13% 53% 43% 33% 30% 14% 14%
Number of trades <500 shares SPY 13% 42% 31% 37% 37% 21% 18%
Number of trades <10,000 shares SPY 13% 57% 50% 33% 26% 10% 12%
Number of tradesP10,000 shares SPY 19% 84% 68% 13% 9% 4% 4%
Mean trade size SPY 3880 4033 3929 Æ 2300 1913 ))) 1057 995 Æ
Median trade size SPY 500 1000 1000 ))) 500 400 ))) 300 300 +++
1
6
7
6
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Total volume QQQ 14% 44% 34% 43% 38% 13% 14%
Volume in trades <500 shares QQQ 6% 9% 7% 68% 61% 23% 26%
Volume in trades <10,000 shares QQQ 9% 26% 22% 53% 47% 21% 22%
Volume in tradesP10,000 shares QQQ 19% 60% 45% 34% 30% 7% 7%
Total number of trades QQQ 7% 16% 14% 60% 54% 23% 25%
Number of trades<500 shares QQQ 6% 9% 7% 67% 59% 25% 28%
Number of trades<10,000 shares QQQ 7% 18% 15% 59% 53% 24% 25%
Number of tradesP10,000 shares QQQ 22% 68% 48% 23% 21% 9% 9%
Mean trade size QQQ 4565 6521 5908 ))) 1698 1684 Æ 1332 1300 Æ
Median trade size QQQ 1000 1500 1500 ))) 500 500 Æ 500 500 +++
Total volume 27 ETFs 10% 36% 34% 55% 48% 9% 8%
Volume in trades <500 shares 27 ETFs 5% 48% 47% 26% 24% 25% 24%
Volume in trades <10,000 shares 27 ETFs 13% 57% 50% 32% 28% 11% 9%
Volume in tradesP10,000 shares 27 ETFs 8% 27% 26% 66% 59% 8% 7%
Total number of trades 27 ETFs 8% 51% 47% 29% 26% 20% 19%
Number of trades<500 shares 27 ETFs 5% 48% 46% 27% 24% 25% 25%
Number of trades<10,000 shares 27 ETFs 10% 56% 49% 29% 27% 15% 14%
Number of tradesP10,000 shares 27 ETFs 12% 40% 38% 53% 45% 7% 5%
Mean trade size 27 ETFs 5511 1643 1759 Æ 7477 9123 Æ 1288 1750 Æ
Median trade size 27 ETFs 3931 1576 1544 Æ 5918 4955 Æ 677 694 Æ
The table shows how traded share volume, number of trades, mean and median trade size for 30 ETFs (SPY, DIA, and QQQ are shown separately) change for
each of the market centers (AMEX, Nasdaq, NYSE, and regional exchanges) when the NYSE enters trading. Before includes 21 trading days prior to NYSE
entry; After includes 21 trading days including and from that date. We use a t-test of equal means and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test to assess whether
changes in mean and median trade size are statistically signiﬁcant. +++, ++, and + is a positive change statistically signiﬁcant at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively. ))), )), and ) is a negative change statistically signiﬁcant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. A Æ means not statistically signiﬁcant. The panel
describing the 27 ETFs shows means across ETFs.
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proportions of total trading volume after NYSE entry range from 34% (QQQ) to
58% (SPY) for AMEX, from 20% (SPY) to 38% (QQQ) for Nasdaq, and from 3%
(DIA) to 14% (QQQ) for the regional exchanges. Large trades are primarily executed
on AMEX and NYSE. Interestingly, the NYSE is gaining market share (volume and
number of trades) predominately in trades greater than 10,000 shares (around 20% in
all three ETFs). This is the trade size category where AMEX is losing most of its vol-
ume. Nasdaq is losing market share about equally across all size categories. 20
4.2. The eﬀect of the NYSE entry on execution cost and liquidity
To measure trading cost, we compute three diﬀerent measures. The quoted spread
QSt ¼ at  bt;
where at is the ask price at time t and bt is the bid price at time t, is an upper bound
on the cost of a round-trip trade within the quoted size. Because this measure ignores
the eﬀect of execution inside or outside the quote, we also compute the eﬀective
spread (see Lee, 1993; Huang and Stoll, 1996)
ESt ¼ 2jpt MPtj;
where pt is the trade price and MPt is the quote midpoint prevailing at the time of the
trade. We use the eﬀective spread as an approximation for the total price impact of a
trade.
Finally, we estimate the realized spread, as proposed by Huang and Stoll (1996),
RSt ¼ 2ItradeðptMPtþ5Þ;
where RSt is the realized spread at time t, Itrade is the trade indicator for the trans-
action at time t which equals +1 if the trade is a buy and )1 if the trade is a sell, and
MPtþ5 is the quote midpoint ﬁve minutes after the transaction.
21 The realized spread
is an approximation for the temporary price impact of a trade. It can be interpreted
as market maker revenues net of the costs of adverse selection. Correspondingly,
(half) the diﬀerence between eﬀective and realized spreads approximates the per-
manent price impact of a trade. 22 We use this measure to approximate the infor-
mation content of trades.
Summary statistics about the submission of quotes and inside quotes are provided
in Table 3. Not surprisingly, the total number of submitted quotes increases after the
NYSE enters the market. Nasdaq generally submits the most quotes before and after
20 To the extent that these large trades contain essential information about the consequences of UTP
trading, market-quality statistics based on SEC Rule 11Ac1–5 likely provide a biased view of order
execution. These statistics do not include ﬂoor orders or orders larger than 10,000 shares and may provide
a misleading picture of trading costs and volume in the ETF markets.
21 We repeated all estimations with a post-trade interval of 30 minutes, but this did not qualitatively
alter our results. We report the 5 minutes version because our sample ETFs are among the most actively
traded securities. Moreover, the estimates are less noisy and in line with market center reports based on
SEC Rule 11Ac1–5.
22 See, for example, Keim and Madhavan (1996) or Huang and Stoll (1996).
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Table 3
Quote submissions and inside quote submissions before and after UTP trading on the NYSE
Period Before After After Before After Before After Before After
Market center ETF All All NYSE AMEX AMEX NAS-
DAQ
NAS-
DAQ
Regionals Regionals
Number of quotes DIA 159,024 228,538 32,514 41,876 52,901 66,115 69,144 51,033 73,979
Number of two-sided
unlocked quotes
DIA 158,268 217,096 31,441 41,656 49,942 65,884 66,862 50,728 68,851
Time at NBBO – both sides DIA 17% 50% 21% 18% 7% 0% 0%
Time at NB bid DIA 48% 69% 54% 44% 37% 1% 1%
Time at NB ask DIA 56% 72% 55% 42% 25% 1% 0%
Number of quotes SPY 324,093 498,326 54,990 54,851 78,813 187,117 195,818 82,125 168,705
Number of two-sided
unlocked quotes
SPY 321,613 458,862 51,431 54,212 71,549 186,219 183,341 81,182 152,541
Time at NBBO – both sides SPY 30% 15% 24% 42% 6% 0% 0%
Time at NB bid SPY 59% 42% 60% 66% 32% 1% 1%
Time at NB ask SPY 64% 42% 57% 67% 25% 1% 0%
Number of quotes QQQ 616,372 792,406 91,834 117,804 105,058 340,408 328,164 158,160 267,350
Number of two-sided
unlocked quotes
QQQ 471,183 572,305 65,640 90,882 77,716 267,602 246,767 112,699 182,182
Time at NBBO – both sides QQQ 5% 16% 19% 24% 18% 1% 1%
Time at NB bid QQQ 30% 38% 43% 57% 48% 10% 10%
Time at NB ask QQQ 26% 45% 46% 49% 43% 9% 10%
Number of quotes 27 ETFs 83,247 124,577 13,004 8,350 11,365 20,306 33,912 54,591 66,296
Number of two-sided
unlocked quotes
27 ETFs 82,866 123,707 12,935 8,288 11,253 20,210 33,653 54,368 65,866
Time at NBBO – both sides 27 ETFs 24% 19% 12% 22% 12% 3% 1%
Time at NB bid 27 ETFs 48% 38% 29% 41% 31% 6% 4%
Time at NB ask 27 ETFs 51% 38% 31% 42% 27% 6% 4%
This table shows how the number of valid quotes and the fraction of time at the national best bid and oﬀer (NBBO), national best bid (NB bid), and national
best ask (NB ask) for 30 ETFs (SPY, DIA, and QQQ are shown separately). Before includes 21 trading days prior to NYSE entry; After includes 21 trading
days including and from that date. The panel describing the 27 ETFs shows means across ETFs.
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the NYSE entry. Before UTP trading, Nasdaq represents the NBBO more frequently
than AMEX (except for the DIA). As the NYSE enters, it is more often at the NBBO
than either AMEX or Nasdaq, except for the QQQ. This observation is consistent
with quote competition, where a new entrant must post-attractive quotes to attract
orders.
We ﬁrst calculate the average time-weighted quoted spread, and trade-weighted ef-
fective and realized spreads for the two 21-trading day windows before and after the
NYSE entry. All tests for time-weighted variables are based on daily observations.
To analyze diﬀerences across diﬀerent trade sizes, we also compute the eﬀective
and realized spreads for small, medium, and large trades (as deﬁned above).
Table 4 contains estimates of the execution cost measures discussed above. We
document dramatic and highly signiﬁcant declines both in the market-center speciﬁc
quotes and in the NBBO. The average (time-weighted) NBBO spread for the entire
market declines signiﬁcantly by 54%, 58%, and 19% for the DIA, SPY, and QQQ,
respectively, after the NYSE enters the market. Similarly, the average NBBO for
the 27 smaller ETFs declines by 25%. Examining each market center individually,
we obtain comparable results: the average (time-weighted) quoted spread, which in-
cludes all valid quotes, decreases by 31%, 36%, and 29% for the three ETFs, respec-
tively. The decline in quoted spreads is large in each market, but most signiﬁcant for
AMEX. One exception is the signiﬁcant increase in Nasdaq quotes of 65% on aver-
age (median of 39%) for the 27 ETFs. As we show below, however, eﬀective spreads
decrease for this market, implying that third-market dealers appear to have turned
away from quote competition.
Average eﬀective spreads decrease by 46% for the DIA, 48% for the SPY, 19% for
the QQQ, and 27% for the small ETFs. All changes are again highly statistically sig-
niﬁcant at the 1% level and fairly consistent across market centers. Finally, average re-
alized spreads decline relatively less but still statistically signiﬁcantly by 39%, 36%,
15%, and 31% for DIA, SPY, QQQ, and small ETFs, respectively. For example, the
SPY has an average NBBO spread of 6.4 cent before and 2.7 cent after. Its average ef-
fective spread decreases from 5.3 to 2.8 cent and the realized spread from 3.7 to 2.3 cent.
The greater decline in eﬀective spreads relative to realized spreads is caused by sig-
niﬁcant reductions in the permanent price impact of trades. The NYSE entry reduces
permanent price impacts between 23% (QQQ) and 74% (SPY) (for the small ETFs,
changes in the permanent price impact are not signiﬁcant). Interestingly, these de-
clines are generally signiﬁcant for trades smaller than 10,000 shares, but not for the
largest trades where the NYSE gains the most market share. In Section 4.4, we relate
this ﬁnding to the presence of informed trading and discuss it in more detail.
Percentage declines of average eﬀective and realized spread across diﬀerent trade
sizes are similar for each ETF, but large trades of more than 10,000 shares seem to
experience a greater reduction in average realized spreads than medium-sized trades.
Because the realized spread can be interpreted as the temporary price impact due to
order processing cost and market power of market makers, these results imply that
the NYSE entry has the direct consequence of reducing this portion of trading costs,
especially for large trades. However, trading-cost reductions are comparable across
markets, suggesting that other markets respond to the new competition by posting
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Table 4
Measures of trading cost before and after UTP trading on the NYSE
Period Before After %
Change
Test of
equal
means
After Before After %
Change
Test of
equal
means
Before After %
Change
Test of
equal
means
Before After %
Change
Test of
equal
means
Market center ETF All All NYSE AMEX AMEX NAS-
DAQ
NAS-
DAQ
Regio-
nals
Regi-
onals
Time-weighted
quoted spread
DIA 0.221 0.154 )31 ))) 0.058 0.101 0.057 )44 ))) 0.158 0.134 )15 0.405 0.365 )10 )))
Time-weighted
NBBO
DIA 0.083 0.038 )54 )))
Eﬀective spread DIA 0.063 0.034 )46 ))) 0.029 0.063 0.034 )46 ))) 0.058 0.034 )42 ))) 0.069 0.035 )49 )))
Eﬀective spread
(trades <500
shares)
DIA 0.063 0.033 )48 ))) 0.027 0.064 0.033 )48 ))) 0.057 0.033 )42 ))) 0.067 0.032 )52 )))
Eﬀective spread
(trades <10,000
shares)
DIA 0.062 0.034 )46 ))) 0.028 0.063 0.034 )46 ))) 0.059 0.034 )41 ))) 0.072 0.040 )44 )))
Eﬀective spread
(tradesP10,000
shares)
DIA 0.068 0.039 )42 ))) 0.037 0.067 0.039 )41 ))) 0.069 0.041 )41 ))) 0.130 0.043 )67 )))
Realized spread DIA 0.038 0.023 )39 ))) 0.001 0.038 0.026 )32 ))) 0.028 0.023 )18 Æ 0.058 0.032 )45 )))
Realized spread
(trades <500
shares)
DIA 0.048 0.029 )39 ))) 0.016 0.046 0.026 )43 ))) 0.044 0.038 )12 Æ 0.058 0.027 )54 )))
Realized spread
(trades <10,000
shares)
DIA 0.030 0.020 )33 ))) )0.003 0.033 0.025 )23 )) 0.016 0.014 )11 Æ 0.056 0.039 )31 )
Realized spread
(tradesP10,000
shares)
DIA 0.043 0.022 )50 )) 0.005 0.041 0.031 )25 Æ 0.041 0.010 )77 Æ 0.308 0.202 )35 Æ
1/2 (eﬀ. sp-real. Sp.) DIA 0.012 0.005 )57 ))) 0.014 0.013 0.004 )67 ))) 0.015 0.005 )63 ))) 0.005 0.002 )69 Æ
1/2 (eﬀ. sp-real. Sp.)
(trades <500
shares)
DIA 0.007 0.002 )77 ))) 0.006 0.009 0.004 )59 )) 0.007 )0.003 )141 ))) 0.004 0.003 )42 Æ
1/2 (eﬀ. sp-real. Sp.)
(trades <10,000
shares)
DIA 0.016 0.007 )57 ))) 0.016 0.015 0.004 )70 ))) 0.021 0.010 )53 ))) 0.008 0.001 )90 Æ
1/2 (eﬀ. sp-real. Sp.)
(tradesP10,000
shares)
DIA 0.012 0.009 )29 Æ 0.016 0.013 0.004 )66 Æ 0.014 0.016 13 Æ )0.089 )0.079 )11
Time-weighted
quoted spread
SPY 0.368 0.255 )31 ))) 0.040 0.104 0.041 )61 ))) 0.087 0.071 )18 ))) 0.913 0.866 )5 )))
Time-weighted
NBBO
SPY 0.064 0.027 )58 )))
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Table 4 (continued)
Period Before After %
Change
Test of
equal
means
After Before After %
Change
Test of
equal
means
Before After %
Change
Test of
equal
means
Before After %
Change
Test of
equal
means
Market center ETF All All NYSE AMEX AMEX NAS-
DAQ
NAS-
DAQ
Regio-
nals
Regi-
onals
Realized spread 27
ETFs
0.087 0.060 )31 ))) 0.032 0.093 0.074 )20  0.069 0.056 )18  0.100 0.077 )23 
Realized spread
(trades <500
shares)
27
ETFs
0.097 0.064 )34 ))) 0.043 0.106 0.083 )21 Æ 0.084 0.053 )36 ) 0.102 0.077 )25 )
Realized spread
(trades <10,000
shares)
27
ETFs
0.074 0.055 )25 )) 0.028 0.077 0.065 )16 Æ 0.042 0.052 26 Æ 0.101 0.075 )25 Æ
Realized spread
(tradesP10,000
shares)
27
ETFs
0.060 0.051 )14 Æ 0.026 0.046 0.051 11 Æ 0.085 0.056 )35 ) 0.047 0.083 76 Æ
1/2 (eﬀ. sp-real. Sp.) 27
ETFs
0.009 0.008 )6 Æ 0.019 0.009 0.004 )59 )) 0.015 0.009 )41 Æ 0.003 0.002 )13 Æ
1/2 (eﬀ. sp-real. Sp.)
(trades <500
shares)
27
ETFs
0.006 0.007 26 Æ 0.014 0.005 0.001 )78 )) 0.010 0.011 16 Æ 0.002 0.003 15 Æ
1/2 (eﬀ. sp-real. Sp.)
(trades <10,000
shares)
27
ETFs
0.012 0.009 )21 Æ 0.020 0.013 0.006 )52 )) 0.022 0.009 )60 ) 0.002 0.003 66 Æ
1/2 (eﬀ. sp-real. Sp.)
(tradesP10,000
shares)
27
ETFs
0.018 0.011 )37 Æ 0.024 0.025 0.009 )65 Æ 0.005 0.008 60 Æ 0.023 0.001 )95 Æ
This table shows measures of average trading costs for 30 ETFs (SPY, DIA, QQQ are shown separately) change for each of the market centers (AMEX,
Nasdaq, NYSE, regional exchanges) when the NYSE enters trading. Before includes 21 trading days prior to NYSE entry; After includes 21 trading days
including and from that date. In addition, trading costs are stratiﬁed by trade size. % Change refers to the percentage change in trading costs after versus
before NYSE entry, a t-test of equal means assesses the statistical signiﬁcance of the change (+++, ++, and + is a positive change statistically signiﬁcant at 1%,
5%, and 10%, respectively. ))), )), and ) is a negative change statistically signiﬁcant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively;  Æ means not statistically signiﬁcant).
For time-weighted measures, the tests are based on 21 daily observations before and after UTP trading.
The quoted spread at time t is computed as QSt ¼ at  bt where at is the ask price at time t and bt is the bid price at time t. We report the time-weighted average
of all valid quotes, regardless of whether they represent the national best bid and oﬀer (NBBO). In addition, we report the time-weighted average of the
NBBO. The eﬀective spread is computed as ESt ¼ 2jpt MPtj where pt is the trade price and MPt is the quote midpoint prevailing at the time of the trade. The
realized spread is computed as RSt ¼ 2Itradeðpt MPtþ5Þ. Itrade is the trade indicator for the transaction at time t which equals +1 if the trade is a buy and )1 if
the trade is a sell, and MPtþ5 is the quote midpoint ﬁve minutes after the transaction. Half the diﬀerence between eﬀective and realized spread is an
approximation for the price impact of a trade.
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lower price schedules. Overall, all other things constant, these ﬁndings imply that the
increased competition has lowered trading cost substantially.
4.3. Changes in the size of quotes
Increased competition on spreads may prompt market makers to quote smaller
depths. 23 In this case, the ultimate eﬀect on trading costs and market liquidity would
be ambiguous. For this reason we analyze changes in time-weighted quoted bid and
ask sizes in Table 5. We document substantial increases in quote size both at the
NBBO and for the average size at each market centers best quote. 24 Subsequent
to the NYSE entry, the aggregate depth oﬀered at the NBBO increases between
68% (27 ETFs) and 569% (SPY bid). While the additional NYSE quote in itself ac-
counts for a substantial portion of the increase, we also document economically and
statistically signiﬁcant increases in the other market centers sizes. Thus, the NYSE
entry appears to have caused both a decrease in the diﬀerent spread measures and an
increase in the average quoted depth for all three ETFs.
4.4. Regression analysis
We have documented in Table 1 that overall ETF trading volume has increased
after the NYSE entry. It is generally accepted that trading volume, volatility, and
price level have a substantial impact on cross-sectional and time-series variation in
bid–ask spreads (see Demsetz, 1968; Benston and Hagerman, 1974; Stoll, 1978).
While these results may not directly apply to the behavior of spreads over time,
we use these three variables as controls to isolate the eﬀects of the NYSE entry.
Our dependent variables are quoted and eﬀective spreads. To make the results com-
parable, we employ trade-weighted quoted spreads (recording only quotes that are in
eﬀect at the time of a trade) because eﬀective spreads are trade-weighted by construc-
tion. We individually regress these measures on a constant, the log of the total vol-
ume of the 50 trades prior to the current trade, the log of the standard deviation of
the 50 transaction returns prior to the current trade, the log of the previous trade
price, and a dummy variable that equals zero if the trade occurred before and one
if the trade occurred after the NYSE entry. To additionally control for the exchange
where the trade is executed, we add dummy variables for NYSE, AMEX and Nas-
daq in a second regression. We obtain virtually identical results when we scale the
dependent variables by the quote midpoint (not reported).
23 As has happened, for example, after decimalization reduced the minimum tick size to one cent. See
the NYSE Report on Decimalization of Trading, submitted to the SEC on September 7, 2001 (available:
www.nyse.com).
24 To compute NBBO depth, we add the depth of each market center that has a quote at the NBBO.
This sum is computed separately for the bid and the oﬀer sides. Results are qualitatively unchanged when
only the size in the last market to change the NBBO is used. While we report overall time-weighted sample
means in the table, the test statistics are based on the 21 daily observations before and after UTP trading.
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Table 5
Quoted depth before and after UTP trading on the NYSE
Period Before After %
Change
Test of
equal
means
After Before After %
Change
Test of
equal
means
Before After %
Change
Test of
equal
means
Before After %
Change
Test
of
equal
means
Market center ETF All All NYSE AMEX AMEX NAS-
DAQ
NAS-
DAQ
Regio-
nals
Regi-
onals
Time-weighted quoted bid size DIA 138 381 176 +++ 546 370 869 135 +++ 37 102 176 +++ 7 7 0
Time-weighted quoted ask size DIA 146 374 156 +++ 555 399 872 119 +++ 36 65 81 +++ 3 3 0
Time-weighted quoted bid size
at NBBO
DIA 224 722 222 +++
Time-weighted quoted ask size
at NBBO
DIA 264 763 189 +++
Time-weighted quoted bid size SPY 355 499 40 +++ 911 1024 1002 )2 38 80 111 +++ 3 2 )33
Time-weighted quoted ask size SPY 405 504 24 +++ 920 1174 1025 )13 ) 38 67 76 +++ 3 2 )33
Time-weighted quoted bid size
at NBBO
SPY 165 1104 569 +++
Time-weighted quoted ask size
at NBBO
SPY 209 1135 443 +++
Time-weighted quoted bid size QQQ 48 146 207 +++ 394 84 129 54 +++ 46 50 9 13 12 )8 )))
Time-weighted quoted ask size QQQ 49 158 225 +++ 424 86 142 65 +++ 38 45 18 ++ 22 21 )5 )))
Time-weighted quoted bid size
at NBBO
QQQ 66 172 161 +++
Time-weighted quoted ask size
at NBBO
QQQ 65 168 158 +++
Time-weighted quoted bid size 27 ETFs 157 246 56 +++ 414 387 491 27 +++ 45 34 )24 ))) 40 44 10 +++
Time-weighted quoted ask size 27 ETFs 162 253 56 +++ 412 411 517 26 +++ 34 37 9 +++ 41 44 7 ++
Time-weighted quoted bid size
at NBBO
27 ETFs 216 363 68 +++
Time-weighted quoted ask size
at NBBO
27 ETFs 239 401 68 +++
This table shows how time-weighted bid and ask depth (in round lots) for all valid quotes, and time-weighted bid and ask depth at the national best bid and
oﬀer (NBBO) for 30 ETFs (SPY, DIA, and QQQ are shown separately) change for each of the market centers (AMEX, Nasdaq, NYSE, regional exchanges)
when the NYSE enters trading. Before includes 21 trading days prior to NYSE entry; After includes 21 trading days including and from that date. We use a
t-test of equal means, applied to daily estimates before and after UTP trading, to assess whether changes in depth are statistically signiﬁcant. +++, ++, and +
is a positive change statistically signiﬁcant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. ))), )), and ) is a negative change statistically signiﬁcant at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively. A Æ means not statistically signiﬁcant.
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Table 6
Regression analysis of spreads
Dependent variable (in $) DIA DIA SPY SPY QQQ QQQ 27 ETFs 27 ETFs
Panel A: Quoted spreads
Intercept )0.425 )0.414 )0.462 )0.453 )0.017 )0.017 0.606 0.594
log (volume) 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 )0.001 )0.001
log (50-trade return standard
deviation)
0.017 0.017 0.020 0.020 0.005 0.005 0.018 0.017
log (price) 0.131 0.129 0.140 0.138 0.020 0.020 )0.083 )0.081
NYSE trade )0.003 )0.001 0.000 )0.014
AMEX trade 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
NASDAQ trade )0.002 )0.002 0.000 )0.005
UTP dummy )0.030 )0.030 )0.020 )0.019 )0.002 )0.002 )0.037 )0.036
No. of obs. 43,017 43,017 122,566 122,566 594,276 594,276 27 27
Adj. R2 (p-value F -test) 0.384 0.386 0.408 0.409 0.046 0.046 0.134 0.142
Panel B: Eﬀective spreads
Intercept 0.165 0.161 0.180 0.198 0.061 0.061 0.552 0.519
log (volume) 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0. 001 0.001
log (50-trade return standard
deviation)
0.017 0.017 0.027 0.027 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.014
log (price) 0.003 0.005 0.016 0.012 0.022 0.021 )0.089 )0.083
NYSE trade )0.009 )0.001 0.002 )0.010
AMEX trade )0.003 0.005 0.003 0.003
NASDAQ trade )0.006 0.001 0.003 )0.007
UTP dummy )0.021 )0.021 )0.011 )0.011 )0.003 )0.003 )0.030 )0.029
No. of obs. 43,017 43,017 122,566 122,566 594,276 594,276 27 27
Adj. R2 (p-value F -test) 0.148 0.151 0.143 0.147 0.043 0.045 0.076 0.090
The table shows coeﬃcient estimates of an OLS regression of quoted spreads (restricted to quotes in eﬀect at the time of a trade, to make the results
comparable to those for eﬀective spreads) (Panel A) and eﬀective spreads (Panel B) for 30 ETFs. Results reported for individual ETFs (DIA, SPY and QQQ)
are the estimated coeﬃcients, while those reported for the 27 ETF group are averages of ETF-speciﬁc estimates. UTP dummy equals zero if the trade occurred
before and one if the trade occurred after NYSE entry. , , and  means statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. For the 27 ETF
group, tests refer to a simple cross-sectional test that the 27 coeﬃcients equal zero.
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Table 6 presents individual regression results for the three large ETFs and coeﬃ-
cient averages for the 27 small ETFs (estimated separately). The ﬁrst column for
each ETF shows the coeﬃcients for the regression without exchange dummy vari-
ables, and the second column shows the coeﬃcients with exchange dummies. All con-
trol variables have positive coeﬃcients and are generally statistically signiﬁcant
(except for quoted spreads of the small ETFs, where past volume and price level
are not signiﬁcant). The results are comparable to Demsetzs (1968) cross-sectional
ﬁndings and are also consistent with Easley and OHaras (1992), who analyze the
eﬀect of time between trades on prices and spreads. Their model implies that higher
volume (indicating an information event) leads to wider spreads and greater transac-
tion-price volatility, which is what we ﬁnd in Table 6.
The most important result concerns the coeﬃcients for the before/after UTP
dummy variable. They are all signiﬁcantly negative, even after controlling for
changes in volume, price level, and volatility. These results also hold after adding
the dummy variables for the exchanges in the second set of regressions. The esti-
mated coeﬃcients on the before-after dummy imply that the additional competition
causes quoted spreads to decline between 0.2 cents (QQQ) and 3.6 cents (27 ETFs),
while eﬀective spreads decline between 0.3 cents (QQQ) and 2.9 cents (27 ETFs). The
coeﬃcients of the exchange dummy variables imply that trades on NYSE and Nas-
daq are consistently associated with signiﬁcantly lower quoted and eﬀective spreads
than trades on the AMEX.
Overall, the regression results conﬁrm that trading costs, whether measured in
terms of quoted or eﬀective spreads, have declined for each of the three ETFs after
the NYSE began trading. Together with larger quoted depths, this ﬁnding is consis-
tent with the view that the NYSE is introducing beneﬁcial competition when it enters
the market. We also document a signiﬁcant decline in realized spreads across mar-
kets and ETFs, which can be interpreted as a decline in the temporary price impact
due to order processing cost and market maker rents. Because this decline is greatest
for the largest trades, where the NYSE gains the most market share, the NYSE entry
appears to have reduced market maker rents. We return to this issue in Section 4.2.
These results question the competitiveness of the pre-NYSE market; if market cen-
ters had already competed eﬀectively, how could entry of another center have such
dramatic eﬀects on trading costs? It is especially remarkable given reduced rents in
the Nasdaq market since the OHR were implemented in 1997 (Weston, 2000), the
existing competition with a specialist market similar to that of the new entrant,
and display rules for limit orders. In the next section, we discuss and analyze alter-
native explanations for our results. 25
25 Consistent with lack of competition in the pre-UTP market, it is also interesting to note that the
smallest decline in trading cost occurred in the QQQ, which is the most actively traded product. Although
detailed ECN data are not available to us, the QQQ seems to be the ETF that experiences the greatest pre-
UTP competition because of the large share of QQQ trading on Island (see footnote 14). The QQQ also
experienced the smallest (albeit signiﬁcant) decline in market maker rents as approximated by realized
spreads.
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5. Explaining the decline in trading costs
To motivate alternative explanations for the decline in trading costs, we ﬁrst an-
alyze changes in the sensitivity of trading cost to order diﬃculty. Second, we follow
Weston (2000) and decompose the spread into a permanent and a temporary com-
ponent. The permanent component is typically interpreted as representing informa-
tion and inventory cost, and the temporary one as representing order processing cost
and market maker rents. Third, we provide evidence that the decline in trading cost
is not a temporary phenomenon due to preemptive pricing. Competitive pressure to
gain market share may prompt market centers to price below cost. In this case, each
market would be incurring intentional losses and spreads would eventually need to
widen again. We test this hypothesis by analyzing market quality over seven months
before and nine months after the NYSE entry. We also control for the spreads of the
underlying index components to disentangle the eﬀects of UTP trading and the mar-
ket closure in September 2001.
Finally, we investigate whether changes in informed trading can explain the de-
cline in spreads. We test this hypothesis by examining price impacts across trade sizes
and markets, and by computing each markets information share as suggested by
Hasbrouck (1995). For any market center, we argue that a larger ratio of price dis-
covery to trading volume would imply larger cost. We test whether a decline in this
measure can explain lower spreads for at least some markets.
5.1. Changes in the determinants of quoted and eﬀective spreads
The start of UTP trading on the NYSE may change the sensitivity of trading cost
to order characteristics, especially if the pre-UTP market was not competitive. To
investigate this issue, we estimate an augmented version of the regressions presented
in Table 6. In addition to the logarithmic volume, price, and standard deviation con-
trol variables, we include three interactive explanatory variables by multiplying each
with the UTP dummy. This will allow us to assess how the NYSE entry changes the
sensitivity of spreads to volume, volatility, and the price level. The coeﬃcient on the
variable itself represents the sensitivity before UTP, whereas the sum of this coeﬃ-
cient and that of the corresponding interactive variable represents the post-UTP sen-
sitivity.
Table 7 presents two speciﬁcations for each ETF, with and without market center
dummies. For both quoted spreads (Panel A), and eﬀective spreads (Panel B) the
three variables have the same sign as in Table 6 (positive except for the 27 ETFs)
and show similar signiﬁcance levels. The UTP dummy itself has a signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect in both panels. In this speciﬁcation, the dummy coeﬃcient does not represent
the entire eﬀect of UTP trading, because we also allow slope coeﬃcients to change.
To interpret the conditional eﬀect of NYSE entry, we compute predicted values eval-
uated at the independent-variable means. As in Table 6, we ﬁnd that the conditional
mean of quoted and eﬀective spreads declines substantially in virtually all cases.
The interesting result in Table 7 is that all signiﬁcant interaction terms (most of
them are signiﬁcant) have the opposite sign as the underlying variables coeﬃcient.
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Table 7
Changes in the sensitivity of spreads to volume and volatility after UTP trading
Dependent variable (in $) DIA DIA SPY SPY QQQ QQQ 27 ETFs 27 ETFs
Panel A: Quoted spreads
Intercept )0.739 )0.737 )1.164 )1.143 )0.028 )0.028 0.980 0.932
log (volume) 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 )0.001 )0.001
log (volume)UTP )0.004 )0.004 0.000 0.000 )0.001 )0.001 0.000 0.000
log (50-trade return standard
deviation)
0.021 0.021 0.031 0.031 0.006 0.006 0.021 0.021
log (50-trade return standard
deviation)UTP
)0.009 )0.009 )0.019 )0.019 )0.002 )0.002 )0.007 )0.006
log (price) 0.202 0.201 0.305 0.300 0.024 0.024 )0.183 )0.172
log (price)UTP )0.203 )0.207 )0.322 )0.317 )0.007 )0.007 0.164 0.145
NYSE trade )0.003 )0.001 0.0000 )0.013
AMEX trade 0.001 0.001 0.0003 0.000
NASDAQ trade )0.002 )0.001 0.0001 )0.004
UTP dummy 0.888 0.906 1.371 1.348 0.014 0.015 )0.672 )0.589
No. of obs. 43,017 43,017 122,566 122,566 594,276 594,276 27.000 27.000
Adj. R2 (p-value F -test) 0.388 0.390 0.425 0.426 0.047 0.047 0.141 0.149
Predicted quoted spread before
UTP
0.068 0.065 0.047 0.047 0.023 0.023 0.114 0.109
Predicted quoted spread after UTP 0.038 0.035 0.029 0.029 0.021 0.021 0.120 0.107
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Panel B: Eﬀective spreads
Intercept )0.055 )0.061 0.222 0.267 0.077 0.075 0.952 0.935
log (volume) 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.011
log (volume)UTP )0.001 )0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 )0.011 )0.011
log (50-trade return standard
deviation)
0.019 0.019 0.033 0.033 0.016 0.016 0.000 )0.001
log (50-trade return standard
deviation)UTP
)0.003 )0.003 )0.011 )0.011 )0.002 )0.002 0.017 0.018
log (price) 0.052 0.054 0.019 0.009 0.019 0.019 )0.232 )0.230
log (price)UTP )0.125 )0.125 )0.022 )0.012 0.004 0.004 0.157 0.152
NYSE trade )0.008 )0.002 0.002 )0.010
AMEX trade )0.003 0.005 0.003 0.003
NASDAQ trade )0.006 0.001 0.003 )0.007
UTP dummy 0.542 0.542 0.008 )0.039 )0.031 )0.029 )0.449 )0.423
No. of obs. 43,017 43,017 122,566 122,566 594,276 594,276 27.000 27.000
Adj. R2 (p-value F -test) 0.148 0.151 0.145 0.149 0.043 0.045 0.083 0.098
Predicted eﬀective spread before
UTP
0.058 0.044 0.044 0.046 0.031 0.036 0.170 0.169
Predicted eﬀective spread after
UTP
0.037 0.023 0.033 0.036 0.028 0.033 0.093 0.079
The table shows coeﬃcient estimates of an OLS regression of quoted spreads (restricted to quotes in eﬀect at the time of a trade, to make the results
comparable to those for eﬀective spreads) (Panel A) and eﬀective spreads (Panel B) for 30 ETFs. Results reported for individual ETFs (DIA, SPY, QQQ) are
the estimated coeﬃcients, while those reported for the 27 ETF group are averages of ETF-speciﬁc estimates. UTP dummy equals zero if the trade occurred
before and one if the trade occurred after NYSE entry. , ,  means statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. For the 27 ETF group,
tests refer to a simple cross-sectional test that the 27 coeﬃcients equal zero. The predicted values for the dependent variable are computed using the estimated
coeﬃcients applied to the means of the independent variables.
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In addition, their magnitude is generally less than two times the pre-UTP coeﬃcients
(with the exception of DIA prices in Panel B). This implies that the NYSE entry has
signiﬁcantly attenuated the eﬀect of changes in volume and volatility on spreads.
Given the results in Table 4 that the average price impact of trades did not increase,
we interpret this result as evidence that more diﬃcult orders can be executed at a
lower premium after UTP trading begins. For example, a 10% increase in the volatil-
ity of the DIA increases quoted spreads by 2.1 cents before, but only by
2:1 0:9 ¼ 1:2 cents after UTP trading. Alternatively, if the market lacked competi-
tion prior to the NYSE entry, this deﬁciency was particularly pronounced for more
diﬃcult orders.
5.2. Did market maker rents decrease?
A reduction in the premium for more diﬃcult orders hints at a decline in market
maker rents, but may also reﬂect other changes such as diﬀerent pricing strategies.
Following Weston (2000), we now attempt to explain the decline in trading cost
by decomposing the spread into an information/inventory component and an order
processing/market power component. This analysis provides a simple estimate of the
relative contribution of each component to the overall decline of the spread, and may
shed more light on the importance of market maker rents in the pre-UTP market. As
in Weston (2000), we estimate the spread components based on Huang and Stoll
(1997), using the following model:
MPt MPt1 ¼ aþ bHSt1It1 þ et;
where t indexes trades, MP is the NBBO quote midpoint, HS is half the quoted
NBBO spread, and I is a trade indicator that is equal to one if the trade executes
above the midpoint, equal to minus one if it executes below, and zero otherwise. We
estimate the regression using OLS and separately for the pre- and post-UTP periods.
The coeﬃcient b represents the estimated percentage of the spread due to informa-
tion and inventory eﬀects; the reported order processing/market maker portion is
computed as 1 b. To obtain the dollar cost for these two components, we multiply
the percentage components by the average eﬀective spreads estimated over the re-
spective period. 26
The results are presented in Table 8. For DIA, SPY, and the 27 ETFs, we ﬁnd a
decline in the percentage of the spread due to information and inventory cost, and a
corresponding increase in the percentage due to market power (to interpret the sec-
ond component as rents, we must assume that order processing cost remain un-
changed after the NYSE entry). Due to the decline in eﬀective spreads across
26 This procedure is diﬀerent from the one suggested in Huang and Stoll (1997), whose model assumes a
constant spread that is distinct from the observed quoted spread in our estimation. They estimate the
spread and the information component jointly from a nonlinear equation; our estimation, for simplicity, is
based on observed spreads and OLS. Empirically, the regression shows virtually no sensitivity to
alternative speciﬁcations. We repeated the regression without an intercept and after deleting midpoint
trades without altering any of the results.
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ETFs, this ﬁnding implies that both information/inventory cost and market maker
rents have declined substantially in dollar terms (the average percentage declines
of both components are signiﬁcant at the 5% level, using a cross-sectional t-test).
The dollar decline in the rent component, however, is about 10 times as large as
the dollar decline in information or inventory cost. This ﬁnding corroborates our in-
ference that lack of competition in the pre-UTP market is a major factor in explain-
ing why the NYSE entry has lowered trading cost. On the other hand, it is also
possible that the decline in information cost, also substantial in relative terms, is re-
sponsible for the reduction at least in some market centers. Because trades and
quotes are shared among market centers via ITS, we cannot apply the spread decom-
position to the individual markets. Rather, to address the role of information costs
more explicitly, we analyze market-speciﬁc permanent price impacts and the relative
proportions of informed traders in Section 4.4.
5.3. Do spreads widen again over time?
If the NYSE entry has led to pre-emptive pricing, we would expect quotes to
widen again after a certain period. While we cannot determine the duration of
below-cost pricing, the large volume in these markets presumably makes it extremely
expensive. It therefore seems unlikely, in our opinion, that all market centers simul-
taneously are able to sustain below-cost pricing over several weeks. To address this
Table 8
Changes in spread composition associated with UTP trading
ETF Information and inventory
component
Order processing and market
maker rent component
In % of spread $ Cost In % of spread $ Cost
Before UTP DIA 9.6 $0.0060 90.4 $0.0567
After DIA 8.4 $0.0028 91.6 $0.0309
Before SPY 6.0 $0.0032 94.0 $0.0501
After SPY 2.8 $0.0008 97.2 $0.0269
Before QQQ 3.3 $0.0010 96.7 $0.0312
After QQQ 3.3 $0.0009 96.7 $0.0252
Before 27 ETFs 13.1 $0.0133 86.9 $0.0947
After 27 ETFs 5.1 $0.0023 94.9 $0.0764
The table contains a decomposition of the spread based on Huang and Stoll (1997), estimated separately
before and after the NYSE began trading three AMEX-listed ETFs. For each ETF, we estimate the
following regression: MPt MPt1 ¼ aþ bHSt1It1 þ et, where MP is the quote midpoint, HS is half the
quoted spread, and I is a trade indicator that is equal to one if the trade executes above the midpoint, equal
to minus one if it executes below, and zero otherwise. The coeﬃcients b represent the estimated percentage
of the spread due to information and inventory eﬀects and are reported in the table; the reported order
processing cost and market maker rents are computed as 1 b. To obtain dollar cost for these two
components, we multiply the percentage components by the average eﬀective spreads estimated over the
respective period. Results reported for individual ETFs (DIA, SPY, and QQQ) are the individual esti-
mates, while those reported for the 27 ETF group are averages of ETF-speciﬁc estimates. The panel
describing the 27 ETFs shows means across ETFs.
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possibility empirically, we analyze market quality for the three initial ETFs between
January 2, 2001 and April 15, 2002. 27 This period includes the initial NYSE an-
nouncement (4/6/2001), the start of trading (7/31/2001), and the market closure
(9/11/2001 to 9/16/2001), and we consider these three events separately in the estima-
tion.
We compute three absolute measures of trading cost over this period: time-
weighted NBBO spreads and sizes, and trade-weighted eﬀective spreads. While these
are standard measures of trading costs, they are somewhat diﬃcult to interpret be-
cause of the market closure. During the weeks after the closure, spreads increased
signiﬁcantly in the entire market, and it is diﬃcult to disentangle the adverse eﬀects
of the closure and the preceding events from any widening due to idiosyncratic rea-
sons. Therefore we also compute two daily relative measures of trading cost over the
period, where we use the spreads of the ETFs underlying index portfolios as bench-
marks.
For each trading day and each individual index security, we compute the daily
time-weighted NBBO and trade-weighted eﬀective spreads. 28 The index spreads
are then deﬁned as the daily equally weighted average across securities. Stock-
speciﬁc individual spreads are weighted equally, although the Dow Jones Industrial,
Nasdaq 100, and S&P 500 use diﬀerent weights. We believe that equally weighting is
preferable, because it reduces the eﬀect of individual stocks on the relative spread
measures. Moreover, it avoids weights that change over time, which would make
the resulting relative measure harder to interpret. In a ﬁnal step, we compute the rel-
ative quoted spread as the daily ratio of time-weighted quoted ETF spreads to the
index spread. Relative eﬀective spreads are computed analogously. These relative
measures can be interpreted as the cost of trading the ETF relative to the cost of
trading the entire underlying portfolio of stocks. A ratio of one would indicate that
the two trading strategies have similar cost for a ﬁxed investment amount; a ratio
smaller than one would imply that it is cheaper to trade the ETF.
To analyze the time variation in these measures, we average each variable across
the three ETFs and estimate OLS regressions on four time dummy variables. The
dummy variables represent the post-announcement period (4/6/2001 to 7/30/2001),
the post-UTP period (7/31/2001 to 9/10/2001), the post-closure period (9/17/2001
to 12/31/2001), and the next year (1/2/2002 to 4/15/2002). The results are not sensitive
to the deﬁnition of these periods and we obtain qualitatively identical results when
the three ETF regressions are estimated individually.
27 Both NYSE and AMEX have waved specialist commissions and exchange fees for trades in ETFs.
This waiver might suggest, but does not imply below-cost pricing for several reasons. First, as highly active
securities ETFs generate relatively large data revenues. Second, specialist commissions only apply to ﬂoor
orders that do not execute within 5 minutes; again given the active market, this is a rare occurrence. Third,
trading fees are likely to aﬀect mostly small brokers, because fees are subject to an annual cap for most
brokers; and ETF trading is dominated by institutions.
28 Stocks that are either added to or removed from the index may have trading characteristics that do
not reﬂect typical behavior and we remove all stocks that were added or deleted during the analysis
period from the analysis. No changes occurred in the DJII, 17 in the Nasdaq 100, and 26 in the S&P 500.
This exclusion does not qualitatively alter our results.
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The estimates in Table 9 show no evidence that market quality reverts back to
pre-UTP levels by any of the measures. For example, the average NBBO is 19 cents
lower in the post-UTP period than in the pre-announcement period. During the sub-
sequent post-closure period, the NBBO is still about 16 cents lower. While this rep-
resents a signiﬁcant increase (at the 1% level) over the post-UTP period, we cannot
directly determine whether this increase is due to the closure or to preemptive
pricing. However, because the NBBO spread is still signiﬁcantly below pre-
announcement levels and also narrows again in the 2002 period, we believe that a
market-closure eﬀect is the more likely explanation. Results for eﬀective spreads
and the size of the most recent best quote are also consistent with this explanation.
Moreover, spreads also decline signiﬁcantly relative to those of the underlying
stocks. For example, before the UTP announcement, eﬀective spreads average
87% of the average component securitys spread; this ratio declines by about 44 per-
centage points after the NYSE entry. Overall, these results suggest a permanent im-
provement in market quality.
We also show that part of the decline in quoted and eﬀective spreads materializes
already between announcement and implementation. The absolute measures
imply that the decline after the announcement represents about half of the cumula-
tive decline after the trading decision. The relative NBBO also declines after the
Table 9
Time variation in market quality measures
Mean time-
weighted
quoted
spread
(NBBO)
(in $)
Mean eﬀec-
tive spread
(in $)
Mean depth
at the inside
quote (size of
most recent
quote only, in
round lots)
ETF time-
weighted
NBBO/mean
index NBBO
(in %)
ETF eﬀective
spread/mean
index eﬀec-
tive spread
(in %)
Intercept 0.223 0.111 437 82.8 87.3
Post-announcement
dummy
)0.097 )0.033 )244 )12.1 )0.8
Post-UTP dummy )0.194 )0.078 104 )54.3 )44.0
Post-market closure
dummy
)0.163 )0.056 27 )35.0 )22.0
2002 Dummy )0.187 )0.073 44 )49.8 )42.4
Adj. R2 (p-value
F -test) Durbin–
Watson statistic
0.624 0.608 0.585 0.446 0.362
This table shows regressions of ﬁve daily market-quality measures on time dummy variables for three
ETFs (SPY, DIA, and QQQ) between January 1, 2001, and April 30, 2002. The post-announcement period
ranges from 04/06/2001 to 7/30/2001, the post-UTP period from 7/31/2001 to 9/10/2001, the post-closure
period from 9/17/2001 to 12/31/2001, and the 2002 period from 1/1/2002 to 4/15/2002. The two relative
measures are computed as follows. For each trading day and each individual index security, we compute
the daily time-weighted NBBO and trade-weighted eﬀective spreads. The index spreads are then deﬁned as
the daily equally weighted average across securities. The relative quoted spread is then deﬁned as the daily
ratio of time-weighted quoted ETF spreads to the index spread, and analogously for relative eﬀective
spreads. , , and  means statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The number
of observations is 215.
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announcement, but amount to less than one quarter of the cumulative post-UTP de-
cline. Although the relative eﬀective spread shows no announcement eﬀect and
quoted size actually declines after the announcement, these results suggest that mar-
ket participants already act at the time of the announcement. While other interpre-
tations are possible, this is consistent with our interpretation that market makers
earned rents before UTP trading, and moved to ‘‘smoothen’’ the transition to the
more competitive environment expected with the NYSE entry.
5.4. Fluctuations in informed trading and contributions to price discovery
Informed traders present a cost for the market maker that is reﬂected in spreads.
While ETFs have less potential than stocks for private information about future
security-speciﬁc cash ﬂows (Subrahmanyam, 1991; Gorton and Pennacchi, 1993),
market makers may still face non-trivial risk of informed trading. For example, Saar
(2000) argues that uncertainty about trader endowments and intentions is related to
the price impact of trades. Saar and Yu (2001) ﬁnd empirical support for this asser-
tion. They show that changes in information about future cash ﬂows are neither suf-
ﬁcient nor necessary for changes in diﬀerent measures of the price impact. More
generally, ETF traders still face the risk of trading against a party that has private
information about future broader events that will aﬀect the ETFs underlying secu-
rities or future ETF order ﬂow. It is also conceivable that a trader has private infor-
mation about ETF-speciﬁc order ﬂow (e.g., when learning about larger long or short
positions that will be hedged in the ETF cash market). For the argument analyzed
here it is not relevant whether the traders private information is about ﬁrm-speciﬁc
cash ﬂows or other price-relevant variables; a redistribution of informed order ﬂow
and contributions to price discovery from the pre-UTP markets may help explain
lower post-UTP trading cost.
5.4.1. Changes in the permanent price impact of trades
We ﬁrst re-examine the permanent price impact of trades, measured as half the dif-
ference between eﬀective and realized spreads, in Table 4. Across ETFs and markets
the average price impact of trades is signiﬁcantly smaller after the NYSE entry (not
signiﬁcant for the regionals). The overall decline in price impacts is consistent with
the post-UTP increase in quoted depth documented in Table 5. Heﬂin and Shaw
(2001) document that not trade size per se, but rather the trade size relative to quoted
depth is positively related to the adverse selection component of the spread. Thus,
greater depth implies ﬂatter price schedules and smaller permanent price impacts.
If informed traders have migrated to the NYSE, we would expect signiﬁcantly lar-
ger price impacts on the NYSE than on the other market centers. Table 4 shows that
this is true for DIA and the small ETFs, but not for SPY and QQQ, where the price
impacts on the NYSE are equal to or below the post-UTP market average. Thus,
while we cannot rule out that informed traders have migrated from other market
centers to the NYSE, it seems unlikely that such a migration can explain the reduced
trading cost across markets and ETFs.
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5.4.2. Changes in the information share across markets
In this section, we examine how contributions to price discovery shift after the
NYSE starts trading the initial set of three ETFs. In particular, we relate the esti-
mates of each market centers information share to its volume share to obtain an in-
dication of potential shifts in the relative cost of information production among
market centers. Hasbrouck (1995) suggests measuring a market information share
as the proportional contribution of this market to the variance of the common
random-walk component of prices. To compute the information share for each mar-
ket, we estimate the error correction model for the month prior and for the month
subsequent to the NYSE entry, separately for quoted bid and ask prices (for brevity,
the coeﬃcient estimates are not reported). Our model speciﬁcation involves 60 lags
and a time resolution of one second. If a market did not update its quote at a given
time, we use the preceding quote. To obtain the quote series for the regional ex-
changes, we choose the best overall quote among the regionals for each second.
Our ﬁrst result is that both the bid and ask series of all market centers, before and
after NYSE entry, are cointegrated of the highest possible order at a signiﬁcance
level of 1%. Thus, quotes from the various market participants contain information
about the underlying eﬃcient price and are related to each other. 29 In that sense,
price discovery does not appear to be adversely aﬀected by possible market fragmen-
tation due to the NYSEs entry.
The second set of results, the estimated information shares of each market center,
is reported in Table 10. For the three large ETFs, estimates of absolute and relative
information shares (the ratio of the information share to the corresponding volume
share) are computed both before and after the NYSE entry. 30 Ceteris paribus, the
proﬁtability of market making should be lower in a market where this relative infor-
mation share is high.
Before UTP trading and relative to trading volume, we ﬁnd that information pro-
duction is greatest on Nasdaq for the SPY and the QQQ, and greatest on AMEX for
the DIA. These results imply that Nasdaq should have had the greatest cost of in-
formed trading prior to UTP trading, closely followed by AMEX. Because in the
three ETFs more than 90% of all Nasdaq quotes are from Archipelago, an ECN, this
is consistent with Huang (2002). 31 After UTP trading, the NYSE obtains the largest
relative information share in the QQQ and the DIA, and the second largest in the
SPY. AMEX share for all three ETFs declines slightly, Nasdaqs share increases
for the SPY and slightly for the DIA.
29 We apply the method developed by Johansen (1988) to test for cointegration of the price series. For
brevity, the results are not reported here and are available upon request.
30 We report information shares for each market as the average of upper bound, lower bound, bid and
ask quotes. The estimates are very close to each other and alternative speciﬁcations do not qualitatively
alter our results. Unfortunately, it is diﬃcult to obtain standard errors for the information shares.
Hasbrouck (1995) uses the cross-sectional variation, but this is not feasible in our setting, because several
of the smaller ETFs do not have suﬃcient trading volume for estimation.
31 Huang suggests that ECNs attract informed traders (and contribute substantially to price discovery)
because of their anonymity and their large pool of liquidity traders.
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Overall, these results suggest that a lower proportion of informed trading may
contribute to the decline in AMEX spreads, but not to that in Nasdaq spreads.
The decline in the AMEX information share is consistent with the changes in price
impact reported in Table 4, which generally decline more across all trade-size cate-
gories on AMEX than on Nasdaq. Note that large trades (potentially attributable
to informed traders) seem to have migrated from AMEX to NYSE (Table 2).
Nevertheless, if the migration of informed traders were to explain the changes in
market quality documented above, we would expect the NYSEs large information
share to be associated with above-average trading cost or spreads that exceed pre-
UTP AMEX spreads. This is not what we ﬁnd in Tables 4 and 5. Finally, the pre-
UTP lack of competition appears most relevant in Nasdaq trading. This is because
Nasdaq trading cost declined almost as much as on AMEX, but without a decline in
the relative cost of information production. These ﬁndings suggest positive economic
proﬁts for AMEX and Nasdaq InterMarket market makers prior to UTP trading.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we study the impact of the NYSE entry into the trading of 30
AMEX-listed ETFs. These securities previously traded primarily on AMEX, the
Nasdaq InterMarket, Island, and several regional exchanges. The NYSE gained
an average market share exceeding 10% of overall trading volume during the month
Table 10
Contributions to price discovery before and after UTP trading on the NYSE
Market center ETF Before UTP trading After UTP trading
Information
share (%)
Information
share/volume
share
Information
share (%)
Information share/
volume share
AMEX DIA 82 1.3 61 1.1
Nasdaq DIA 17 0.6 18 0.8
Regional exchanges DIA 0 0.0 0 0.1
NYSE DIA 20 1.2
AMEX SPY 52 0.7 33 0.6
Nasdaq SPY 49 1.9 49 2.5
Regional exchanges SPY 0 0.0 0 0.0
NYSE SPY 18 1.0
AMEX QQQ 20 0.4 9 0.3
Nasdaq QQQ 78 1.8 56 1.5
Regional exchanges QQQ 2 0.2 6 0.5
NYSE QQQ 25 1.8
This table shows average contributions to price discovery in percent for three ETFs (SPY, DIA, and QQQ)
for each market center before and after the NYSE enters trading. Before includes 21 trading days prior to
NYSE entry on July 31st, 2001; After includes 21 trading days from that date. The information shares are
based on the estimation of a vector error correction model of quotes at 1 s intervals. Average information
shares are obtained by ﬁrst averaging the mean of upper and lower bound estimates for both bid and ask
quotes, and then averaging across bid and ask. The ratio of information and volume shares is based on the
Total volume shares reported in Table 2.
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after its entry. This volume appears to be primarily drawn away from AMEX,
mostly in large trade sizes above 10,000 shares.
We document double-digit percentage declines in quoted, eﬀective, and realized
spreads after the NYSE entry. The diﬀerence between eﬀective and realized spread,
an approximation for the permanent price impact of a trade and another aspect of
liquidity, also decreases signiﬁcantly. At the same time, quoted depth increases be-
tween 68% and 569%, depending on the market center and the ETF. The NYSE
entry considerably improves liquidity in the entire market and also in the individual
market centers. We conduct detailed tests documenting that this result is not due to
shifts in informed trading or a temporary phenomenon.
In light of the similar trading protocols on AMEX and the NYSE, several studies
that document increased competition on Nasdaq after the OHR were implemented in
1997, and additional competition by other exchanges, ECNs, and limit order traders,
it is diﬃcult to reconcile our ﬁnding with a competitive market before the NYSE
entry. In particular, our analysis of spread components suggests that market-maker
rents constitute the component of trading cost that experienced the greatest dollar de-
cline after the NYSE entry. How could rents exist in the pre-UTP market? Bessem-
binder (2002) argues that payment for order ﬂow implies an agency problem in
routing orders, and hence increased rents. As UTP trading started in the wake of dec-
imalization, which likely reduced the proﬁtability of payment for order ﬂow, NYSE
entry may have triggered a decline in this practice and promoted quote competition.
As an alternative to the rent explanation, another hypothesis may also explain the
decline in trading cost. It rests on the assumption that diﬀerent market centers have
comparative advantages with certain order types. For example, one market may be
better able to handle a large volume of small, uninformed orders, because it has a
low-cost execution and screening mechanism. Another market may be better able
to handle a high volume of large orders, because it has a deeper pool of liquidity.
Under this view, the NYSE entry may have led to a more eﬃcient allocation of or-
ders to the respective lowest-cost market center, such that all markets are able to
oﬀer lower trading costs. Harris (1993) suggests that segmentation of markets, which
is not the same as fragmentation, improves service. We have shown that the NYSE
has attracted an over-proportionate share of large and presumably more diﬃcult or-
ders. If it were able to execute these orders at lower cost than other market centers,
we would expect market-wide trading costs, especially for large orders, to de-
crease. 32 This is to some extent consistent with our evidence. However, we also ﬁnd
that market maker rents decline and that Nasdaq approximately maintains its share
of informed trading. Furthermore, it is not clear why a market that has a competitive
advantage in executing large orders has not an even greater advantage in executing
small orders. Yet, we do not observe a whole-scale migration to the NYSE, which
attains a market share of below 10%. Thus, the eﬃciency hypothesis can at best
32 One shortcoming of this hypothesis is that if a market executed large orders at lower cost, it must be
the case that it also executes smaller (easier) orders at lower cost. Yet, the NYSE attracted a relatively
smaller market share in small orders. In practice, however, it is possible that small orders remain with a
market center that oﬀers rebates (payment for order ﬂow), even if execution costs are higher.
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explain part of the market improvement. To further diﬀerentiate this hypothesis
from a beneﬁcial increase in competition, it is necessary to observe either the actual
cost or proﬁt from market making; we hope that future studies using more compre-
hensive data can address this question.
Overall, our ﬁndings strongly support the view that competition for order ﬂow
among market centers is beneﬁcial for overall liquidity and does not seem to ad-
versely aﬀect price discovery. While the substantial and growing volume in the
ETF market may make the results relevant in their own right, a caveat against gen-
eralizing our results is warranted. Our study includes only 30, albeit the most actively
traded, ETFs. In addition, ETFs are derivative (‘‘basket’’) securities and their trad-
ing characteristics may not generalize to common stocks. Yet, our results suggest
that regulation that impedes competition between market centers is not optimal, es-
pecially in the context of ETFs. For example, mandatory-display requirements in
Regulation ATS and to some extent current ITS rules limit quote competition by let-
ting markets free-ride on each others price discovery. In this context, the SECs re-
cent decision to relax ITS trade-through rules for certain ETFs seems a step in the
right direction. 33
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